Prescriptive acquisition is to acquire right in rem by possessing another’s property for a given period, as respecting the establishment of possession for a long period of time. It is different from the Copyright Act’s purposes of protecting the rights and interests of authors with respect to their works, balancing different interests for the common good of society, and promoting the development of national culture. As a result, Article 772 of the Civil Code does not apply mutatis mutandis to copyright. In addition, copyright cannot be created by possession as it is intangible existence. It cannot exclude others like the holder of rights in rem by possessing specific res corporals. Therefore, copyright cannot be in state of possession as if it were personal property. Regarding the nature of the “copyright license”, the so-called copyright registration or recordation is not, as the appellant claims, presumed to legally have the right when the appellee acquire the copyright from Company A on February 1, 1990. Therefore, it could not be said that Company A possessed the state of copyright and require the real holder of copyright to make concessions. Transaction safety will receive excessive protection if a third party can acquire bona fide copyright. That may reduce an author’s willingness of creating, damaging to the purposes of the Copyright Act. Therefore, the regulation of bona fide acquisition cannot apply mutatis mutandis to copyright. As a result, it is groundless for the appellee to claim to acquire bona fide copyright of the disputed music work according to either Article 966 Paragraph 1 or Articles 801 and 948 Paragraph 1 of the Civil Code.

Economic Right, Prescriptive Acquisition, Bona Fide Acquisition